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Abstract— Proof-of-Work (PoW) schemes have been proposed
in the past. One prominent system is HASHCASH which uses
cryptographic puzzles. However, work by Laurie and Clayton
(2004) has shown that for a uniform PoW scheme on email to have
an impact on SPAM, it would also impact on senders of legitimate
email. A Targeted Cost PoW scheme on email is proposed as a
potential solution to this problem. By selectively applying the
cost to SPAM it has the potential to limit SPAM, without unduly
penalizing legitimate senders. Moreover, it is constructed using
only current SPAM filter technology, and a small change to the
SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol). Specifically, it is argued
that such a system can make sending SPAM 1,000 times more
expensive than sending legitimate email (so called HAM). Also,
unlike the system proposed by Liu and Camp, it does not require
the complications of maintaining a reputation system.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. A Brief Introduction To PoW As A SPAM Counter Measure
Proof-of-Work (PoW) systems were suggested as a counter
measure to SPAM as early as 1992 [1], and the concept has
been rediscovered and developed since then, e.g, [2]–[9].
In simple terms, a PoW system uses a puzzle challenge that
is hard to solve, but easy to verify. The solution to the puzzle
is presented to the receiving email server as proof of having
completed a certain amount of work. The intention is that this
will limit the number of messages that a Spammer can send
per unit time. When applied to all email messages, I call the
scheme a Uniform Cost Proof-of-Work (UC PoW) Scheme.
That is, the computational burden is equal for every message,
whether it is HAM or SPAM.
In reality, due to differences in computational capacity of
mail servers, the burden is not uniform. These differences can
be great, probably around two orders of magnitude between
the fastest and slowest computers that send email. However,
the difference between the fastest and slowest random access
memories are much less than the difference between the fastest
and slowest CPUs. Classes of puzzles have been suggested that
use this property to keep the burden as uniform as possible,
to reduce the performance difference to a factor of less than
five [8]. This would seem to be a reasonable achievement.
B. Problems With UC PoW As A SPAM Counter Measure
Assuming for the moment, then, that (approximately) UC
PoW systems are possible, we turn to the problems they face.
The following is a list of problems with UC PoW systems
(mostly drawn from [10] and [11]):
1) Message Latency: By inducing a delay on every mes-
sage, the implied real-time delivery semantic of email is
broken. This makes a UC PoW scheme socially unattractive.
2) Inequitable Burden: The problem of inequitable burden
of PoW schemes due to server speed has already been men-
tioned, and even though [8] showed how to reduce the margin
to less than five-fold, that is still considerable.
3) Mailing Lists: Mailing lists send a great many messages.
If each recipient invoked a uniform email PoW burden, then
large mailing lists would become expensive, if not impractical.
That is, the indiscriminate nature of the PoW scheme causes
mailing lists to be impacted to the same degree as a Spammer
who sends the same quantity of messages.
4) Robot Armies: Moreover, because many Spammers con-
trol hundreds of thousands of compromised computers around
the world, it would seem that Spammers have access to
much larger CPU resources than most legitimate senders.
Thus a uniformly applied PoW scheme on email may actually
hurt legitimate senders more than it hurts Spammers. Also,
Spammers are able to maintain legitimate CPU resources,
further compounding the problem.
To summarize, we are reminded of what has been previously
established from a theoretical perspective, that for any UC
PoW scheme to be sufficient to reduce SPAM, then the several
percent of legitimate email senders who send relatively many
email messages will be prevented from doing so [10]. In
other words, a UC PoW scheme, regardless of the quality
of the algorithms it uses, cannot succeed, precisely because
it burdens SPAM and HAM uniformly. Therefore, if PoW is
to work, it cannot be with a UC model.
C. Reputation-Free Targeted Cost PoW As A SPAM Counter
Measure
Having argued that a UC PoW scheme cannot succeed, I
suggest that PoW schemes, generally, are not fatally flawed.
Note that for every objection in the previous text, that the
source is the indiscriminate application of a uniform burden
on all email messages. The logical alternative is to apply the
burden on a more intelligent basis. An ideal implementation
would place no burden on legitimate messages (HAM), and
an infinite and unavoidable burden on SPAM. Such a system
would immediately, by definition, stop all SPAM — unfortu-
nately this result cannot be produced with current technology.
While we have no 100% accurate method to discriminate
HAM and SPAM, we do have effective heuristic email clas-
sification systems, such as SpamAssassin [12], CRM114 [13]
and many others. Thus, by using the judgements of an existing
SPAM filter to estimate the probability of a given message
being SPAM, it is possible to dynamically determine the
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burden to apply to that message. That is, we can still place
the vast majority of the burden on Spammers, with the precise
proportion determined by the quality of the SPAM filters. As
with previous PoW schemes, the work would be to solve a
specially created cryptographic puzzle of appropriate difficulty.
Such a scheme has a subtle but important difference to using
SPAM filters alone: The failure mode for falsely classifying
HAM as SPAM is more robust, as the delivery of an incorrectly
classified message is only resisted, instead of being refused.
For example, it would be unrealistic to configure a SPAM filter
to reject messages that are only 5% likely to be SPAM, even
though that may be the threshold required to reject practically
all SPAM. However, it is completely reasonable to resist the
delivery of messages that are 5% likely to be SPAM. I call this
method of the selective application of a PoW scheme Targeted
Cost Proof-of-Work (TC PoW).
All this assumes that all computers can perform the work
required by a PoW scheme at a uniform rate. But computers
vary in speed. Fortunately, if both small hand held devices and
super-computers are excluded from consideration (this seems
reasonable, since few legitimate mail senders use hand held
devices, and few spammers have sustained access to super
computers), most computers connected to the Internet vary in
clock speed by no more than about one order of magnitude.
Also, research has been conducted into creating problems that
are limited by a computers random access memory speed,
which is a quantity that varies much less than CPU speed
[6], [8]. Moreover, there seems to be no reason to suggest that
the average computer being used to send SPAM will be much
faster than the average computer being used to send legitimate
email. Thus, the system should be reasonably fair.
Some SPAM filters have demonstrated better than 99.9%
accuracy [13] Therefore, by using SPAM filters to inform a TC
PoW scheme, it should be possible to correctly resist 99.9%
of SPAM, but only resist 0.1% of HAM. Thus Spammers are
burdened almost 1,000 times more per message, on average,
than legitimate senders.
By shifting the vast majority of the computation burden
from legitimate senders to Spammers, PoW should be feasible.
Consider the calculations presented by [10] that showed how
a UC PoW scheme would hurt legitimate senders who send
more than 250 emails per day. The graph presented by [10]
suggests that 1.56% of legitimate senders would fall into this
category. If the cost to send (on average) were reduced by a
factor of 1,000, then legitimate senders could send of about
250,000 messages per computer per day, while still limiting
Spammers to about 250 messages per computer per day.
Moreover, if the advantage is 1,000 times, then some
legitimate sending capacity can be sacrificed to further limit
the sending of SPAM. I suggest that a TC PoW scheme require
proof of approximately 1 hour of work for messages suspected
of being SPAM (assuming 99.9% accurate classification).
In that case, legitimate senders could deliver about 24,000
messages per computer per day, while Spammers would be
limited to only 24 messages per computer per day. Assuming
that Spammers have about 107 computers at their disposal, this
would limit daily spam volumes to only 24 million messages
per day — about one SPAM for every 20 Internet users.
If the system is detuned to accommodate a SPAM classifier
that is less accurate, then the advantage would be reduced,
either by limiting the daily capacity of legitimate senders,
or by allowing Spammers to send more SPAM, or perhaps
a combination of the two.
Even a classification accuracy of only 95% gives a 20:1
advantage to HAM over SPAM, which would allow legitimate
senders to deliver several thousand messages per computer
per day, while limiting Spammers to only a couple of hundred
messages per computer per day. These limits should accommo-
date practically all legitimate senders ( [10] suggest that fewer
than 0.1% of users send more than a couple of thousand email
messages per day), while limiting SPAM to similar volumes as
HAM (since the vast majority of legitimate senders send many
fewer messages per day — according to [10], the median is
about 90 messages per day).
On balance, requiring about an hour of work for each
suspected SPAM seems reasonable, as it severely limits SPAM
delivery capacity, while not burdening legitimate senders too
much: If SPAM filter accuracy of 99.9% is sustainable, then a
cost of 1 hour applies to only 0.1% of legitimate email, giving
an average delivery cost of only 3.6 seconds.
Thus, our TC PoW scheme is similar to the system proposed
by [14]), in that it seeks to place the bulk of the cost of
delivering SPAM onto the sender. However, it is different in
that we avoid the complexity (and hence cost) of maintaining
a reputation system with entries for each sender.
Moreover, as will be described below; a) legitimate bulk
senders can act to reduce their burden; and b) it is possible
for each receiving mail server to configure this behaviour
independently, reflecting the accuracy of their SPAM filters,
or to satisfy local policy. That is, a TC PoW scheme can
improve the HAM to SPAM advantage somewhat beyond what
is immediately apparent, or has been proposed in the past.
However, there are risks that must be managed.
II. MANAGING RISKS
A. Variable SPAM Filter Performance
The effectiveness of a TC PoW system is proportional to the
accuracy of the SPAM filter that underlies it. But SPAM filters
differ in accuracy from site to site. Some of this variability
could be fixed if all sites used the current best SPAM filter
software. However, some variability is due to the kind of email
that sites receive (consider the difference between what staff
at a marketing company, a SPAM researcher, and staff at a
medical centre would consider SPAM and HAM, and also the
difference between the kinds of messages they might receive).
Fortunately, a TC PoW system need not consider these
issues. This is because the receiving mail server specifies
whether to resist delivery of a message, and what the level
of resistance is. The local message administrator can tune
the threshold at which the resistance applies, and the level of
the resistance (perhaps introducing a sliding resistance scale
based on the spamminess of a message, and white lists of
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senders who are never resisted). Therefore each mail server
can optimize the system to minimize the amount of SPAM
that is delivered, without unduly burdening legitimate senders.
B. When Delivery Of Legitimate Mail Is Too Expensive
This leads to an important issue: What happens when a
receiving mail server imposes a burden that a legitimate sender
is not willing to meet? This is the one failure mode that
is undesirable (SPAM that is accepted is less of a problem,
because the receiving mail server may still discard the message
or mark it as SPAM, even after it has been accepted from
the sender). Ideally, the sending mail server should alert the
user that their message was not delivered because it was too
spammy. The user could then re-draft and re-send the message.
Alternatively, they could send a fresh message to the recipient
asking to be added to their receiving mail servers white list
so that future messages will not be resisted.
C. Senders Of “Pressed Ham” (PHAM)
A related problem are the legitimate senders who send
messages that are, perhaps unavoidably, spammy. I call such
messages Pressed Ham (PHAM) — they are not quite SPAM,
but like real pressed ham, they are not as palatable as real
ham. Many solicited advertisements and business newsletters
would fall into this category. First, it is observed that business
senders are the group most able to meet the delivery burden,
assuming that they have a sound and profitable business model.
Secondly, the resistance to delivery creates an economic in-
centive for such senders to avoid some of the evils of PHAM.
Much PHAM can be rendered more palatable by including
only a link in the message, rather than the message itself.
D. Mailing Lists
Mailing lists are relatively straight forward: A well config-
ured mailing list, that carries HAM, will not be penalized. In
contrast, if a Spammer uses a mailing list to attempt to deliver
SPAM to a broad audience, then resistance will be applied to
most deliveries. A mailing list server may opt to deal with
such attempts to use it to deliver SPAM by refusing to deliver
messages that invoke too much resistance during delivery (and
alert the sender of this). This may seem severe, however, some
existing servers already implement similarly harsh policies,
e.g., not retrying delivery after a temporary failure.
E. Leaking SPAM Filter Information To Spammers
Because the resistance is selectively applied to SPAM,
it is possible that Spammers may try submitting successive
refinements of their messages to a given mail server in order
to try to reduce the spamminess of the message, and so avoid
encountering resistance during delivery. To mitigate this risk,
it is recommended that in practise a mail server use a single
degree of resistance: Either delivery is resisted, or it is not. If
graduated resistance is absolutely required, the more coarsely
grained the graduation, the better. The level of resistance
could include a random factor to make it more difficult to
reverse engineer HAM flavoured SPAM. Having had said this,
a finely graduated resistance scheme has some merit, in that
it encourages senders to reduce the overall spamminess of
their messages, and provides a more graceful failure mode for
misclassification of messages. Therefore we briefly consider
the likely impact of using a graduated resistance scheme.
What ever the resistance scheme that is applied, the impact
of any information leaked by a SPAM filter must be consid-
ered. There are two possible scenarios: There are either 1) few
distinct SPAM filters; or 2) many distinct SPAM filters.
If there are few distinct SPAM filters, then the information
leaked by mail servers is already available to Spammers,
because it is feasible for them to run their message through
their own instance of each and minimize the spamminess
of their message that way. This is the situation if there are
relatively few distinct SPAM filters.
The alternative is that there are relatively many distinct
SPAM filters (and this is almost certainly the case due to the
widespread use of Bayesian filtering). In that case, it seems
reasonable to assume that minimizing the spamminess of a
message against any one filter will be of only limited value,
as other filters will target different message features. Moreover,
if there are many distinct SPAM filters, then it would be
difficult for a Spammer to optimize their message against
them all. Finally, there are characteristics of a message that a
Spammer cannot readily change, such as the IP address they
are sending from. Thus the task of reducing the spamminess of
a given message sufficiently to avoid widespread classification
as SPAM is particularly difficult.
However, let us be pessimistic, and assume that a Spammer
does come up with a process that enables them, by repeated
submission of a message, to reduce its spamminess sufficient
to avoid resistance during delivery. In that situation it is
possible to use a “sin bin”, that blocks delivery when this
anti-social behaviour is observed, e.g., repeatedly declining to
meet the delivery burden imposed on a message. Hosts in the
sin bin may not submit any more mail until a timeout elapses1.
However, even if it were possible to minimize the spam-
miness of a message by repeated submission, the repeated
delivery attempts would multiply the network bandwidth re-
quired to deliver each message, thus reducing the amount of
SPAM that can be send per unit time. Therefore, the effects
of any information leaked via a Non-Uniform Targeted-Cost
PoW scheme are mitigated at multiple levels.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE SPAM FRICTION
A. Integrating SPAM Friction Into The SMTP
A TC PoW system must see the body of an email before
it can decide whether to charge for delivery. For this reason,
it is not possible to incorporate it into the existing SMTP
[15]. Specifically, while a receiving mail server could use a
211 message to notify the sender that they must provide PoW,
1In theory, a particularly well organized Spammer could use an army
of robots to send each successive refinement from a different IP address.
However, the complexity of this arrangement, combined with the further
increase in bandwidth required to coordinate the robots, should limit the
practicality and value of this approach.
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250 ESMTP Server Ready
EHLO sending-mail.com
250-rx.com Hello tx.com [10.1.2.3]
250-SIZE 52428800
250-AUTH PLAIN LOGIN
250-STARTTLS
250-SPAMFRICTION ALG0, ALG1, ALG2
250 HELP
PoW ISUPPORT ALG0, ALG1, ALG4
250 OK
MAIL FROM: sender@tx.com
250 OK
RCPT TO: receiver@rx.com
250 Accepted
DATA
354 Enter message, ending with ‘.’
Spam, spam, eggs and spam
.
211 PoW Required (SPAM) 0:21:89273498
PoW RECEIPT 0:21:892734982:1932874368
250 OK id=1HCVqn-000436-HX
Fig. 1. Example SMTP Conversation Using The Proposed PoW Keyword.
there is no mechanism in SMTP that would allow the sender
to deliver the PoW receipt. Thus a new keyword would be
required in SMTP, or an old one must take on a new meaning.
The former seems preferable, since if the SMTP must be
changed, then it should not be done crudely. I suggest the
new keyword PoW as the new keyword that is used to deliver
a PoW receipt to the receiving mail server. Figure 1 shows an
example conversation using the new keyword.
The PoW command is issued in response to a 211 message
that requests proof of work. The string 0:21:892734982 is
the puzzle that the sender must solve, where 0 is the algorithm
number, 21 is the difficulty, and the long string of numbers the
remainder of the problem specification. The response contains
the puzzle concatenated with the solution strings. Otherwise,
the conversation conforms to the SMTP.
B. Transitional Considerations
A critical issue for any changes to the SMTP, is that
backward compatibility is retained. This is why the PoW
capability is issued using a 250 message, and the receiver is
required to acknowledge if it also supports the capability. A
legacy sender that does not support the capability makes no
offer, alerting the receiver of the fact by its silence. Legacy
senders would be handled by introducing a lengthly delay
before offering to accept a message. To prevent abuse by
spammers, a receiving mail server may take several courses of
action when waiting for a PoW receipt, or during the time out
period when communicating with a legacy sender: a) refuse
to accept additional connections from the same sending host;
b) temporarily reject messages sent from the same sending
host; c) accept additional messages, but increasing the delivery
resistance in accordance with the number of messages in this
state. In any case, it is possible to prevent Spammers from
abusing the time out too much. More to the point, the time
out still makes it harder to send SPAM than at present.
Finally, for the scheme to be fully effective it would require
participation by the majority of SMTP servers on the Internet.
The interoperability with the existing SMTP just described
helps to make it possible to progressively implement the
scheme, with value increasing with each adopting server.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I have argued that a Targeted Cost PoW
scheme has the potential to dramatically reduce SPAM vol-
umes. Moreover, its requirements are modest: a) SPAM filters
that are ≥ 99.9% accurate (which already exist); and b)
relatively small changes to the SMTP and mail server software
and configurations. The risk-benefit ratio is compelling: The
chance to make SPAM 1,000 times harder to send than HAM,
and limiting overall SPAM volumes to around 24 messages
per sending computer per day. The obvious next step is to
implement this system, and assess its effectiveness.
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